We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Although self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security, the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state. Thus, we explain the tendency towards autocracy both in history, before the appearance of modern representative governance, and in many low-income countries in modern times.
Introduction
The collective good variously referred to as security, order, protection of property rights, or simply, protection, is a precondition for the provision of ordinary infrastructural public goods and generally for facilitating trade and economic development. Historically, it has also been the first type of good provided by states and is often considered the quintessential and defining attribute of the state. 1 Protection and its variations, though, are different from other collective goods because of the following characteristic: the inputs that are used for its production-soldiers and policemen, swords and guns-contain the seeds for the good's own destruction. Policemen and soldiers, by virtue of their positions, could extract even more than the robbers and bandits they are supposed to guard against. Similarly, rulers who provide protection against internal and external threats can use their power of extraction at an even grander scale. Army generals and colonels, ostensibly at the service of democratic governments, can, and regularly do, topple such governments. Clearly, protection is not an ordinary good.
In this paper, we argue that taking into account such peculiarities in the provision of protection leads to the understanding of two important tendencies, both in history and in the present. First, competition for the provision of protection often takes a very different form than the one we are accustomed to in economics: private providers of protection, instead of competing on the price of their service, typically compete with their means of violence over turf. Under such predatory competition, more competition leads to worse outcomes. Second, our approach helps in understanding the wide prevalence of autocracy, instead of self-governance, in the provision of protection and more generally in the organization of governance.
The type of competition usually examined within economics is one in which different jurisdictions attempt to attract mobile subjects through lower taxation, other privileges, and the provision of public goods. Whereas this type of competition is common nowadays and some economic historians (e.g. North and Thomas 1973) have argued for its importance in the rise of the West, this is hardly the most widespread form that has existed in the past or the sole form of competition that is taking place today. From Ancient Mesopotamia to China, Egypt, Mesoamerica, or Medieval Europe, serfs were tied to the land and free peasants had few outside options, with rulers coming and going but without any change in their incentives for production. Emperors, kings, and princes were fighting for territory and the rents that come with it just as, in more recent times, mafiosi and warlords fight for turf and their accompanying protection rents. Under such conditions, the tribute or protection money paid depends on the relative ability of each side in the use of force. Promising a lower tribute on the part of a provider of protection is not credible unless it reflects that relative power of the 1 In the sense, following Weber's definition, that the provider of protection also has the monopoly in the legitimate use of force (Weber 1978) . Of course, in practice, no actual state has a monopoly in the use of force. For example, the Russian Federal government exerts little control on some republics, mafias, or officials within its territory. Similarly, but less dramatically, US authorities exert not much control in some American inner cities. Weber's usage of the term "legitimate" was likely meant to overcome this problem, although other questions emerge about the meaning of the term, especially for economists. two sides, the ruler and his agents on one side and the ordinary producer usually on the other.
In analyzing the behavior of for-profit providers of protection (or, states), we examine two market structures or regimes: the form of monopolistic competition that we have just described as well as monopoly. The most likely stable outcome that emerges endogenously is to have multiple for-profit states. Each state hires guards to protect its sequestered peasants from bandits, hires warriors to protect its borders from the other states, and receives income from tribute extracted from its peasant subjects. Moreover, under the regime with competing predatory states, under the conditions, we examine total output can even be lower than without a state; all the savings accruing from the provision of internal protection are dissipated in fighting over the same rents created by those savings, whereas states can extract more than simple bandits can. Thus, as far as the market for protection is concerned, and as another manifestation of the peculiar character of the provision of protection, competition is not a good thing.
Another set of market structures, we examine involve self-governing groups of producers, with and without competition from for-profit states. The consensually organized, self-governing state could survive in the absence of predators, and although collective security would be underprovided and the state would be small in size, the welfare of peasants and bandits would be highest under such a market structure. In the presence of competing predators, however, we have found no long-run equilibrium in which a self-governing state would be viable. Because self-governing states face the free-rider problem, they have to be small. Being small in the presence of larger predators though, necessitates too much expenditure per person on external as well as internal security, leaving little room for production with a resultant welfare lower than even the subjects of a predator would enjoy. Thus, this finding helps in understanding the prevalence of autocracy.
The difficulty of establishing democracy and self-governance and the prevalence of autocracy is apparent from many recent experiences as well as more distant ones. From Indonesia to Africa, most post-colonial states have experienced coups and dictatorships to a much greater degree than democratic governance. Earlier, during the nineteenth century the first post-colonial states of Latin America have had similar fates. Our findings are also very relevant to the almost complete absence of selfgovernance during the time between the agricultural revolution and two centuries ago (see, e.g. Finer 1997 ). 2 Our approach is most relevant for this time period given that our model does not allow for the complex institutional web of modern mass representative democracy. 3 Our approach is still helpful though in understanding what occurs in places in which the reach of the modern state is weak. That includes many "failed" states as well as the areas within modern states with power vacuums that allow warlords, gangs, and mafias to develop. As Gambetta (1993) argues the primary commodity sold by the Sicilian mafia is protection (for modeling dedicated to the activities of mafias and gangs see Grossman 1995; Syropoulos 1995, and other contributions in Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995; Skaperdas 1997, 1998) . We tell a story with peasants and bandits which also applies to interactions among shopkeepers and robbers in Moscow, Los Angeles, or Lagos. In the latter case, gangs and mafias come in to fill the gap vacated by the modern state, supplanting it and creating a near-monopoly of force in their area. We help understand why genuine community policing is difficult and why gangs arise in conditions with a power vacuum.
When compared with other work that has viewed the state as maximizing its revenue while providing a public good (Engineer 1989; Findlay 1990; Grossman and Noh 1994; Marcouiller and Young 1995; McGuire and Olson 1996; Moselle and Polak 2001) , we take account of the aforementioned peculiar status of protection relative to other public goods. We also allow for the distribution of output, including taxation by the state, to depend explicitly on the relative ability of affected parties to use force. Thus, taxation has a direct resource cost, whereas the cost of taxation in the existing literature is indirect, as deadweight loss or reduction in market activities. More importantly, in contrast to all this work which supposes a single Leviathan monopolistic state, we allow for different types-for-profit and self-governing-and the combinations of market structures that become then possible. Usher (1989) is probably closest to this paper; but while we are interested primarily in contrasting the different types of states that can arise, Usher's main interest is in the alternation between despotism and anarchy. 4 Grossman and Noh (1994) and Myerson (2008) are promising explorations on how restraints on rulers can evolve based on the dynamic considerations. Grossman and Noh (1994) show how a ruler's discounting of the future is endogenous to his taxing and spending decisions and the factors that might lead to less kleptocratic policies. Myerson (2008) shows how rulers could do better when there are restraints on their rule, interpreted as constitution checks on a ruler's power, and how these can emerge as equilibria in dynamic contests for power.
Because of the different market structures of different complexities that we examine, we start with the simplest one, anarchy, and gradually build to the more complex ones while trying to maintain comparisons with those analyzed earlier.
Footnote 3 continued Michels (1962) : the tendency of representative insitutions and organizations to be hijacked by their elected representatives and officers, primarily due to the informational asymmetry that develops between representatives and the represented. It would be difficult to incorporate this reason in our modeling, although it is clearly an important one that complements our own. 4 Usher's model is considerably more complicated than ours, but his analysis is mainly graphical. Warneryd (1993) also shows some of the difficulties inherent in contractarian stories for the emergence of state organization and property rights. Another related area of research from economics is on the determinants of the size of states (Friedman 1977; Wittman 1991; Findlay 1996; Alesina and Spolaore 2006 , and the survey in Spolaore 2006) . Our approach adds to this literature by deriving the determinants of size, as well as type, from an explicit optimizing model.
Peasants and bandits in anarchy
We begin with the simplest setting in which there is an absence of collective organizations. Individuals out of a population N sort themselves among peasant farmers and bandits where the latter make a living by preying on the peasants. A similar story could be told for an anarchic urban setting by having-instead of peasants and bandits-workers and robbers as the two possible occupations. Each peasant has one unit of a resource that he can distribute between work and self-protection-the higher is the level of self-protection, the lower is the amount of work and the lower is the output that can be produced. Denoting this self-protection activity by x ∈ [0, 1], the peasant can keep a share p(x) of output away from bandits, where p(x) is non-decreasing in x, p(x) ∈ [0, 1], p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1. We will introduce additional assumptions on p(x) as needed later (in Assumption 2 in Sect. 2). The payoff of a peasant is as follows:
Each peasant chooses a level of self-protection x so as to maximize this payoff in (1). We suppose a unique such level, denoted by x * . For the remainder of this paper, we also denote the payoff associated with x * by U * p . The bandits roam the countryside looking for peasants to prey upon. Let N p denote the number of peasants and let N b > 0 represent the number of bandits. A bandit's payoff is as follows:
That is, bandits extract 1 − p(x) of output from each peasant and the more peasants there are relative to bandits, the better it is for a bandit. 5 Note the absence of dependence of p(x) on numbers of peasants and bandits. As our model becomes considerably more complicated in several other dimensions later, this assumption simplifies our analysis by making x * independent of the numbers of bandits and peasants. The independence of x * continues to hold if the share of output kept by a peasant were to be specified as p (x, N p 
where γ is a positive parameter representing the defensive ability of peasants and r (x) an appropriately specified increasing function.
Given that a peasant's payoff is uniquely determined by the choice of x * (and equals U * p ), we are interested in an equilibrium state, whereby the numbers of bandits and peasants adjust until a bandit's payoff equals that of a peasant. Formally, an anarchic equilibrium is a number of peasants N * p , a number of bandits N * b , and a bandit's 5 We should mention that the function p(x) could take a probabilistic interpretation, denoting the probability of the peasant prevailing in a conflictual encounter with a bandit (such a function can be justified axiomatically or in other ways as in Hirshleifer (1989) ; Skaperdas (1996) ; Clark and Riis (1998); Jia (2008) ; Rai and Sarin (2009), and Corchón and Dahm (2010) .) Given the risk neutrality of the two types of agents in (1) and (2), a peasant and bandit would be indifferent between such conflict and dividing output with a share p(x) going to the peasant and the remainder going to the bandit.
is continuous, in equilibrium the numbers of peasants and bandits are then given by:
The easier it is to defend output from bandits, as captured by the properties of the function p(·) and the amount of self-protection induced, the more peasants there are relative to bandits. Total output, which we will use in welfare comparisons with collective forms of the organization of protection that we will examine later, equals:
When compared with the "Nirvana" condition without banditry, in which total output would equal N , the lower output under anarchy has two sources: (i) the fact that bandits do not contribute anything to production [the associated welfare loss equals [1 − p(x * )]N ] and (ii) those who become peasants have to divert a fraction of their resources toward self-protection [the associate welfare loss is p(x * )x * N ]. 7
Collective protection
In addition to each peasant taking self-protection measures against bandits privately, several peasants, a village, or a district could take protection measures collectively and such measures can include simple warning systems about the presence of bandits in the area, the formation of a militia that becomes active when there is a threat, the building of rudimentary fortifications to protect crops or other property, or the employment of full-time guards and policemen. We abstract from the particular forms that collective protection takes and we simply suppose that collective protection can be provided more efficiently than self-protection. Letting z ∈ [0, 1] denote the group's average per peasant expenditure on collective protection consisting of k peasants, the effective expenditure on collective protection (equivalent to expenditures on self-protection) received by each peasant is a function f (z) with the following properties:
6 To avoid unnecessary complications we allow for non-integer numbers of peasants and bandits.When these numbers are non-integer in equilibrium, we suppose that I nt [ 
With the payoff of the same agent from part-time banditry equalling (1 − v * )U * b , the total equilibrium payoff thus equals that of any other agent, peasant or bandit. Grossman (1991) models every single agent, not just a marginal one, as allocating time between different occupations (farming, banditry, and soldiering). The justification of continuous variables in the different occupations that we employed here, also holds for the other occupations, the numbers of which we assume continuous in the rest of the paper (guards, warriors, praetorians). 7 With p(x) = x, we have x * = 1/2, there are as many bandits as peasants and total output is 1/4 of potential output. 
Assumption 1 The collective protection technology f
The share of own output retained by a peasant who has contributed x i to collective protection is p(
z j k and z j is the contribution of peasant j in the collective protection of the group. The key property in Assumption 1 is f (z) > z, for it implies that if each peasant in a group were to contribute z to collective protection, instead of contributing it to self-protection, he or she would receive a higher level of effective protection overall. To have this type of protection truly collective, we require that the number of peasants in a group is at least as high as the minimum sizek.
Here, we also collect all the assumptions on the function p(·) that we use. To gain intuition about the effects of the collective protection technology and to facilitate comparisons with the non-cooperative choice we examine later, we briefly consider optimal choices of protection that maximize a welfare objective that takes the size (k) and composition of a group of peasants as given. The objective is to choose x i s and z i s (i = 1, . . . , k) so as to maximize the sum of the payoffs of the peasants belonging to the group:
Given that x i and z i have the same cost to a peasant, but the average protection is higher with collective protection, we might expect that optimal protection should involve collective protection only. This is not the case, however, since given the concavity of f (·), the marginal return of collective protection could fall below the return to self-protection (which, given our specification, equals unity). Thus, the optimal choice involves choosing collective protection up to a certain point where f (z) ≤ 1. When f (z) > 1, no self-protection is undertaken, whereas with f (z) = 1 some self-protection could be undertaken. Whether or not some self-protection is optimal depends on the functional form.
Choosing the right levels of collective and private protection would require a benevolent agent who would also have the power to impose such choices. This would amount to effectively assume away the problem we set out to examine. Thus, instead our task in the remainder it to explore different alternatives-different "industrial organizations" of protection-that could emerge from anarchy and that utilize the more efficient collective protection technology.
Self-governance
One way of utilizing the higher efficiency of collective protection is for peasants to form a self-governing community and voluntarily contribute to collective protection, through a part-time peasants' militia, through the construction of fortifications, or other means.
Consider a group of k (≥k) peasants, with the k initially given, who voluntarily choose between production, contributions to collective protection, and self-protection, that is, each peasant i belonging to the group chooses x i and z i (and, therefore, production which equals 1 − x i − z i ) so as to maximize his payoff as given by
These choices are made simultaneously by all peasants in the group so that they form a Nash equilibrium (Because both f (·) and p(·) are concave (by Assumptions 1 and 2), U pi can be shown to be concave in x i and z i and, therefore, a Nash equilibrium exists.) To analyze such equilibria, first consider peasant i's incentives to choose x i and z i as indicated in the following partial derivatives:
The first term of each equation represents the marginal private benefit of each protection activity, whereas the second term represents its marginal cost. Note how the marginal private benefit of contributing to collective protection in (8) is just 1/k of the value of its marginal social benefit. By comparing (7) to (8), it can be seen that a peasant's marginal benefit of an increase in x i exceeds his of her marginal benefit of an increase in z i if and only if f (z) > k. A more efficient collective protection and a smaller group size increase the incentives for individual contributions to collective protection. Obviously, the least interesting type of equilibrium that might occur is one in which no collective protection is chosen and the resultant choice of individual protection could be shown to be the same as that under anarchy (x * ). Given (7) and (8), we can rule that type of equilibrium out when f (0) > k (i.e., sufficiently effective collective protection when there is no collective protection). The more interesting types of equilibrium are the ones in which positive collective protection is chosen. For simplicity, since the symmetric equilibrium in which individual protection is zero has similar properties to the ones described below, we focus on the symmetric interior equilibrium in which both types of protection are used and such an equilibrium, whereby each member of a group chooses self-protectionx > 0 and collective protectionẑ > 0, can be found by setting (7) and (8) 
Using standard techniques under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following properties can be shown to hold for the interior equilibrium:
(i) Equilibrium collective protection (ẑ)is strictly decreasing in k.
(ii) Equilibrium self-protection (x) is strictly increasing in k (iii) The level of protection (i.e., the share retained by each peasant
is strictly higher than that under anarchy. (iv) A peasant's payoff is strictly decreasing in k.
Property (iv) implies that, if we were to allow for an endogenous determination of group size, the size that would most likely emerge is the minimal one for which collective protection is feasible (i.e., fork). We now introduce the possibility of an endogenous determination of groups.
A self-governing equilibrium is a number of peasantsN p , a number of peasant groupsn p , and a number of banditsN b such that (I) Each peasant belongs to a group, chooses self-protection and collective protection as Nash equilibrium strategies with the payoff function in (6) and peasant payoffs are equalized across groups; (II) No group could form so that it would yield a higher payoff to its peasants; (III) If security is imperfect, bandit payoffs are equal to those of peasants; if security is perfect,
Condition (II) along with property (iv) above (whereby a peasant's payoff in strictly decreasing in group size) imply that all groups are of the same size. Then, condition (III), again along with property (iv), implies that group size must equalk. The following Proposition summarizes the main attributes of self-governing equilibria. 11
Proposition 1 Consider a self-governing equilibrium under Assumptions 1 and 2 under which each member of each group contributes both to collective protection and self-protection and such an equilibrium has the following properties: (i) Each group is of minimum sizek; (ii) the number of peasants (N p ) is higher than the number of peasants under anarchy (N * p ) and the number of bandits (N b ) is lower than the number of bandits under anarchy (N * p ); (iii) the welfare of peasants belonging to a group and the welfare of bandits is higher than that under anarchy.
Because the minimal scale for collective protection against bandits,k , can be considered small the self-governing groups that will form will be of small size. We should Footnote 10 continued complicated. Letz be defined by f (z) = k. Then, the interior equilibrium exists if
(This condition is derived by evaluating (7) at x i = 0 and z i =z.) Otherwise, the symmetric equilibrium involves collective protection only. 11 Note that, as specified, a self-governing equilibrium exists only if the integers N andk are the ones that would yield the exact integer number of groups. To allow for general existence, the definition would have to be modified so as to allow for non-equalization of the payoffs of some individuals in ways, however, that would make it tedious to analyze here without changing the essence of the comparative statics found.
note that self-governance involves considerable coordination and decision costs which would also favor small size and, in combination with the free-rider problem, could render self-governance more problematic than it appears thus far.
Protection for profit
Instead of having peasants voluntarily provide a portion of their time for collective protection, an entrepreneur-Leviathan, the chief, local lord, or Mafia don-could hire full-time guards to protect peasants against bandits in return for tribute. His objective would be to maximize the difference between his receipts from tribute minus his costs. Receipts from tribute are likely to be higher the better is the level of protection and the larger is the number of peasants. Thus, it appears that as far as collective protection is concerned an entrepreneur could have incentives to provide it for profit.
A monopoly protection by Leviathan
We begin with the simpler form of market structure, whereby protection is provided monopolistically by an agent coming from the outside. We call this agent Leviathan. 12 Monopoly is also virtually the only form of market structure that has been studied in other work on the profit-maximizing state and, therefore, we can make appropriate comparisons more easily.
Leviathan can utilize the same collective protection technology introduced in Sect. 2 and satisfying Assumption 1. He hires guards to protect peasants against bandits but also, at least indirectly, to extract tribute from the same peasants. Letting N g denote the number of guards, f (
represents the units of collective protection received by each peasant. 13 The extraction of tribute is also facilitated by an elite corps, the praetorians (denoted by N pr , a fixed number), who also monitor the guards in the duties, contribute to administration, and generally serve as a portmanteau variable for factors we cannot completely specify here. 14 The payoffs of the occupations of guard and praetorian are determined by how much the peasants manage to keep. For given numbers of guards and peasants, and self-protection level x by a peasant, the maximum share of output that could theoret-12 Leviathan was a sea monster in the Old Testament and had various interpretations in Jewish and Christian traditions, including the representation of the devil and satan. Leviathan was also the title of Hobbes' famous book of political philosophy, originally published in 1651, and it represents the sovereign to whom all the citizens have given the authority of new absolute rule in exchange for peace. Here, Leviathan represents the powerful sovereign without, however, his subjects ceding the right to resist. 13 For some of the results in a previous version of this paper, we allowed for f (
represents the proportion of guards that can be used for genuine protection, with the rest of the guards being used towards the extraction of tribute from peasants. Because our findings do not change qualitatively with this added complication, we chose not to include it in this version of the paper. 14 Wintrobe (1998) specifies a detailed model of a monopolist-for-profit state in which, in addition to repression, resource expenditures to increase the loyalty of subjects is examined. Konrad and Skaperdas (2007) provide a non-cooperative analysis between a ruler/leader and his supporters/guards. They identify conditions that prevent guards from turning their forces against the ruler. ically be retained by the peasant is p(x + f (
). However, as Leviathan has all the coercive machinery of guards and praetorians at his disposal, peasants can retain only whatever they can keep from being snatched away from them. One possibility is that peasants can keep away from Leviathan what they keep away from bandits, p(x). More generally, however, we can suppose a resistance function ρ(x) that indicates the share of output a peasant can keep away from predators (Leviathan and his agents as well as bandits) for any given level of self-protection x. (We suppose that ρ(x) has the same properties as p(·) has in Assumption 2.) Bandits take away
, and each peasant retains ρ(x)(1 − x) of output. Each peasant chooses x to maximize ρ(x)(1 − x) and we suppose a unique such choicex. Therefore, the payoff of peasants-as well as that of bandits, guards, and praetorians-is ρ(x)(1 −x), that is, we suppose that the population sorts itself among the different occupations so that payoffs are equalized across the different occupations, in a similar fashion to that under the anarchic equilibrium of Sect. 1. 15 Clearly, there are many different possible outcomes in such a setting, with the same individual being a peasant in one outcome and a bandit or guard in another one, but all of these outcomes are identical in terms of payoffs for the population.
When ρ(x) < p(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1), we can say that peasants resist Leviathan and bandits less than they can resist bandits in the absence of Leviathan. As Leviathan is more organized than individual bandits are we should perhaps expect this to be the more likely condition. Under such conditions, it can be shown that ρ(x)(1 −x) < p(x * )(1 − x * ). 16 , that is, when the presence of Leviathan reduces the ability of peasants to resist, the welfare of peasants under Leviathan would be lower than that under anarchy. Although we will first examine this case to understand some of its effects, for analytical convenience, we will revert to the simpler case in which ρ(x) = p(x).
Since the number of peasants and bandits depend on the level of protection, which in part depends on the number of guards, Leviathan takes account of the effect his choice of N g has on the number of peasants, N p . Then, in addition to hiring N pr praetorians, Leviathan's choice variable is N g , with the rest of the population becoming peasants and bandits. That is, first Leviathan chooses N g and the fixed number N pr , and, second, the remaining population sorts itself between bandits and peasants.
If, given a choice of
) < 1 and therefore security is less than perfect, there will be a positive number of bandits
With the payoff of a bandit equalized to that of a peasant in this case, the number of peasants that would emerge can be implicitly derived. When security is perfect and there are no bandits, the number of peasants simply equals N − N g − N pr . Overall, for each choice of N g , there will be an induced number of peasants which we denote by the function ν(N g ). Leviathan's objective is to maximize his net receipts by the choice of N g provided these receipts are positive, while taking into consideration the effect on the number of peasants as described by ν(N g ) :
The first term in (9) represents Leviathan's gross revenues (number of peasants times tribute rate times output per peasant). The second term represents the cost of hiring guards and praetorians.
We first show by example what can occur when peasant can resist less in the presence of Leviathan than in his absence. Suppose p(x) = x, ρ(x) = x 2 and f (z) = z 27 , but security is perfect and the number of peasants is 0.9(N − N pr ), higher than that under anarchy for most values of N pr that yield a positive payoff for Leviathan. However, because peasants who are under Leviathan's heavy boot do not produce as much, total output is 3 10 (N − N pr ) which for N pr > 1 6 N (but not too high, so Leviathan's payoff is positive) is lower than total output under anarchy. Thus, contrary to some of the arguments in McGuire and Olson (1996) , Leviathan not only may not improve output as compared to anarchy, but also may actually leave a scorched earth of lower total output, as well as lower welfare for everyone except Leviathan (or, possibly some of his entourage which could be easily incorporated into the model). The key to this finding is the lower resistance of peasants under Leviathan combined with an inability to commit on the part of Leviathan not to take advantage of this lower resistance.
Having made this point, for convenience, we will focus for the remainder on the simpler case of ρ(x) = p(x) for all x. The following Proposition summarizes our findings with (part (i)) and without (part (ii)) a lower resistance by peasants under Leviathan 17
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. (i) If ρ(x) < p(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1), then total output under Leviathan´s rule can be lower than total output under anarchy. (ii) Suppose ρ(x) = p(x) for all x. If the fixed number of praetorians, N pr , is sufficiently low, there is a choice of guards that maximizes Leviathan's payoff at a positive level. Such a choice has the following properties: (a) Total output under Leviathan is higher than total output under anarchy; (b) Total output under Leviathan may be higher or lower than total output under self-governance; the lower N pr is and the higherk is , the higher the ratio of the two outputs is and, therefore, the more likely that output is higher under Leviathan.
When peasants can resist as well as in the presence of Leviathan as in the latter's absence, total output is higher than under anarchy (iia) but does not have to be higher than that under self-governance, despite the latter's free-rider problem. The cost of taxation as manifested in the high self-protection levels of the peasants, along with a high fixed cost and small minimum size for the collective protection technology, can make output under self-governance higher.
Large profits typically attract competitors. With Leviathan appropriating all the extra income, we can expect competitors who would vie for a portion of profits.
Competing lords
Instead of having a single Leviathan and small-time challengers contesting his rule, we will now examine the case in which all individuals ex ante are potential little Leviathans or lords; they can choose this occupation just as they would chose to be peasant, bandit, praetorian, or guard. A lord's job is similar to that of Leviathan in the hiring of praetorians and guards and in receiving tribute from peasants. We continue to maintain the same assumptions about the technology of collective protection and about the sharing of the surplus between lord and peasant. For simplicity, we continue to suppose that ρ(x) = p(x) so that a peasant contributes x * to his private protection and his payoff equals p(x * )(1 − x * ).
The lord, however, has a major headache that Leviathan did not have. Other lords are now after tribute received from peasants, and he needs to defend that tribute against them. He can do that by hiring warriors to keep the other lords outside his territory (and keep the sequestered peasants in) and possibly gain additional territory at their expense. But then the other lords will respond in kind. Thus, the new element in the lords competing against one another is that they will have to hire warriors as well.
In this setting peasants have limited options. They are tied to their land and at the mercy of the lords who compete over how to divide them up. 18 This is a rather different type of competition than the one typically assumed by economists, whereby different jurisdictions attempt to attract mobile subjects through lower taxation or other privileges. Whereas this type of competition takes place in much of the world today and some economic historians (e.g. North and Thomas 1973) have argued for its importance in the rise of the West, this is hardly the most widespread form of competition that has existed in the past or the only form of competition that is taking place today. From Mesopotamia to China, Egypt, Mesoamerica, or feudal Europe, serfs were tied to the land and free peasants typically had no outside options, with rulers coming and going but without any change in their incentives for production. Even in the past two centuries, with the rise of the rights of man, the most liberal of states have sequestered their citizens with barbed-wire borders and passport controls. While we do not deny the importance of tax-and-privilege competition of mobile subjects, we find the 18 In alternative interpretations, the peasants could conceivably decide to go it alone, but they would then receive the same payoff as under a lord. They could also go "into the woods" where they would receive a payoff that may be higher or lower that the prevailing payoff under a lord; effectively we are assuming that such payoff is not higher than that under a lord. The peasants might also try to join a self-governing state, a possibility that we will allow in the next section (where we can only find conditions that lead to an even lower payoff than under a lord or under anarchy).
complete lack of study of this other significant form of competition based on the use of force as providing ample reasons for a first look.
Let n wl denote the number of warriors hired by lord l. For a given number of lords N l and peasants N p , the number of peasants that lord l can sequester, and receive tribute from, is given by
where n w−l = (n wl , . . . , n wl−1 , n wl+1 , . . . , n wN L ) is the vector of warriors hired by the other lords. Also, q(·) satisfies the following properties:
where h(·) is a non-negative, strictly increasing, and concave function, and
. Letting n pr be the fixed number of praetorians and n gl the number of guards hired by lord l, the payoff of the lord can now be written as:
The main difference of (12) from Leviathan's payoff in (9) is the determination of the number of peasants: whereas in (9) the chosen number of guards induces the number of peasants through ν(·), here the number of peasants is determined by the number of warriors the particular lord has relative to other lords. Initially, suppose the number of lords is given atN l > 1. We will next define a notion of equilibrium in which, as earlier, the population other than the lords sorts itself between the occupations that receive the "reservation" payoff of p(x * )(1 − x * ). Who becomes a peasant, bandit, praetorian, guard, or warrior does not materially matter since they all receive the same payoff. Each lord chooses guards and warriors strategically, but (contrary to the case of Leviathan) without taking into account their effect on the total number of peasants (N p ). All the occupational choices and lords' strategic choices are made simultaneously and have to be consistent so that they add up to the total population. The notion is similar in spirit to static notions in general equilibrium in which some players can have some strategic influence on a variable.
We define a short-run lordship regime to be numbers of peasants N p , bandits N b , and for each lord l guards n gl and warriors n wl such that:
(I) Each lord l = 1, 2, . . . ,N l with a payoff function described in (12), takes N p as given, and chooses n gl and n wl simultaneously with other lords so that these choices form a Nash equilibrium;
Part (I) of this definition is straightforward: the lords compete for "market share" through hiring of warriors and the protection they provide to peasants, although each lord individually does not take account of his own effect on the number of peasants. Part (II) states that the number of bandits equals the sum of the bandits in each lord's territory, and the number of bandits in each lord's territory is such that the utility of bandits and peasants is equalized. Clearly, the number of bandits in territory j is inversely related to the total protection level p j and when there is perfect security ( p j = 1) there are no bandits in territory j. Finally, part (I I I ) is a "market clearing" condition, so that the Nash equilibrium choices of warriors and guards, the induced numbers of peasants and bandits, and the fixed numbers of praetorians and lords add up to the total population N .
The problem of existence of such a regime, although analogous to the problem of existence of competitive equilibrium in neoclassical economics, is nontrivial. The proposition that follows provides information on existence, uniqueness, and characterization of the short-run lordship regime. 
. (iv) A short-run lordship regime is unique in the number of lords and symmetric, whereby every lord chooses the same number of guards and warriors. In such regimes, (a) the number of peasants is strictly decreasing in the number of lords and (b) each lord's payoff is strictly decreasing in the number of lords. (The proof is in the Appendix.)
Existence of the short-run lordship regime in part (ii) essentially involves finding a fixed point for a certain function of N p ; the sufficient condition invoked is analogous to the continuity of demand functions in the theory of competitive equilibrium. The properties of the short-run lordship regime in parts (iv), (a) and (b) are intuitively plausible. When an additional lord enters the fray, each lord would increase his number of warriors for a given number of peasants. Since the number of peasants is endogenous, however, their number should decrease in equilibrium with the total number of warriors increasing. A smaller number of peasants shared among a larger number of lords is eventually shown to also yield a smaller payoff for lords.
Additional properties would require employing specific functional forms. For example, consider the following special case of (11) The parameter m is a measure of how easy it is for a lord to increase his dominion when he increases the number of warriors he hires by a small amount, the effectiveness of conflict. Then, under examples for other functions we employed earlier, 20 as the technology of conflict becomes more effective (m increases), the total number of peasants becomes smaller. It appears that this occurs because lords compete more intensely when conflict becomes more effective by hiring additional warriors, without however changing their share of peasants. The effect of this additional demand for manpower is to decrease the population pool from which the peasants are drawn. The end result of an increase in m is a smaller number of peasants, a larger number of warriors per lord, and a smaller number of guards per lord. Such an increase in m also reduces each lord's profits.
In the long-run lords should be allowed to exit and potential lords should be allowed to enter and establish their own state. Since lords come from the population, N , we suppose the long-run number of lords is determined by the reservation payoff in this economy, which is the peasant's payoff
). There will be no incentive for lords to exit and potential lords to enter as long as the existing lords earn a payoff that is at least as high as that of peasants, and if an extra lord were to enter he would receive a lower payoff than that of peasants. Let V N l l denote an (equilibrium) payoff of lord l = 1, 2, . . . , N l under a short-run lordship regime with N l lords. We then define a long-run lordship regime to be a short-run lordship regime (that satisfies (I )-(I I I )) and a number of lords N l such that
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied and a short-run lordship regime exists, under the conditions in Proposition 3(ii), for a sufficiently large number of lords. Furthermore, suppose that if only one lord were to exist, he would receive in equilibrium a higher payoff than a peasant. Then, (i) a unique (in the number of lords) and
19 Hirshleifer (1989) has examined the properties of this functional form; Skaperdas (1996) has axiomatized it as well as the more general form in (11). Note that if
20 that is, under p(x) = x and the technology of collective protection is f (z) = z β (β ∈ (0, 1)) the total number of peasants equals
symmetric long-run lordship regime exists; (ii) the number of peasants and the output of such a long-run lordship regime approximates from above, respectively, the number of peasants and the output under anarchy; in particular:
(The proof is in the Appendix.) Part (ii) of the Proposition states that output and the number of peasants are almost the same as those under anarchy. Free entry of lords essentially eliminates all the extra production that can be achieved by the use of the collective protection technology. What was previously taken by bandits under anarchy is now taken by praetorians, warriors, guards, lords, and, possibly, by bandits as well, without essentially affecting the total output that is produced. (If of course lords can extract more efficiently than bandits can, output could be even lower than anarchy.) Literal anarchy is replaced by a more organized, higher-level anarchy of predatory states.
Why self-governance is difficult
We now show how self-governing states can not in general coexist in the presence of predatory states that are run by lords, even when there is no free-rider problem in providing for defense against other states. We first define an appropriate notion of short-run equilibrium that allows for both lords and self-governing states to coexist. We then show that, under the examples, we have used in various parts of the paper, the equilibrium payoff of peasants belonging to a self-governing state would always fall short of the payoff a peasant could receive in anarchy or under a lord (when p(x) = ρ(x)). Thus, it would not be profitable for such a state to form and a long-run equilibrium with self-governing states would not exist.
Suppose there areN l > 1 lords and a number S ≥ 1 of self-governing states with k peasants each. The lords behave as in the previous section and their payoff functions are as in (12) (except for the slight modification of q(·) below, which has to take account of the warriors of self-governing states). Peasants in self-governing states, in addition to contributing to private and collective protection need to contribute to fighting for their independence by spending some of their time as warriors. Let w s denote the total resources spent on fighting (external enemies) by self-governing state s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}. We suppose that each citizen-peasant contributes an equal portion w s /k to fighting; contributions to private and collective protection are as before voluntary (clearly, if contributions to fighting external enemies were voluntary, the viability of a self-governing state would be even more problematic). Thus, the payoff of a peasant-citizen is:
To maintain their independence, the citizens of state s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S} have to expend effort on war, w s , so that
where w −s is the vector of war efforts by all the other self-governing states,n w is the vector of warriors of all the lordships, and q(·) is the contest success function defined in (11) and appropriately modified to include the war effort of the self-governing states. We are now ready to define an appropriate notion of equilibrium for these states, which is an extension of the short-run lordship regime defined in the previous section.
A short-run integrated equilibrium is defined to be numbers of peasants N p , bandits N b ; for each lord l guards n gl and warriors n wl ; for each self-governing state s a war effort w s ; and for each citizen-peasant in self-governing states choices of private and collective protection such that (Ia) Each lord l = 1, 2, . . . ,N l takes N p and the w s s as given, and chooses n gl and n wl simultaneously with other lords so that these choices form a Nash equilibrium; (Ib) Each self-governing state s = 1, 2, . . . , S chooses w s so that (14) is satisfied; (Ic) Each citizen-peasant takes w s as given and chooses private and collective protection levels so that they form a Nash equilibrium; (II)
for all s n bs = kp s / p(x * ); and p j and p s are the shares of output kept away from bandits in lordship j and self-governing state s;
We will now derive the integrated equilibrium under the following functional forms:
, and the modification of (11) where the share of peasants of lordship j is q j = n wl / N l j=1 n wj + S s=1 w s . It can be shown that lords choose to provide perfect security and all choose the same number of guards n gl = (N p −Sk)/4N l . Lords also choose the same equilibrium number of warriors n wl = (N p − Sk)(N l −1)/N 2 l . All the self-governing states choose war effort w = k(N l − 1)/N l . In turn, all citizen-peasants choose contributions to collective production of z = 1/4k 2 and private protection of x = 1/2N l − (2k − 1)/8k 2 . The equilibrium payoff of citizen-peasants can be found by substituting w /k, x , and z in (1 ), and equals
We are interested in comparing this equilibrium citizen-peasant payoff to that of a peasant under a lord, which (since p(x) = ρ(x)) also equals the peasant's payoff under anarchy, p(x * )(1 − x * ). Under the example, we are examining this payoff is 1/4, which we need to compare to U p in (15). Straightforward algebra shows that U p < 1/4 holds for all N l > 1 and for all k. Thus, a citizen-peasant's payoff under a short-run integrated equilibrium is always lower than the payoff of a peasant under a lord or under anarchy. Consequently, there would be no incentive to form a selfgoverning state under such circumstances and thus self-governance could not be viable in the long-run. We summarize the finding of this section in the form of a Proposition. The burden of defense against other states imposes such a cost on the individual citizen-peasants so that there are not many resources left for internal protection against bandits and for production.
Proposition 5 Consider the short-run integrated equilibrium under the following functional forms: p(x)
We should emphasize that we do not completely rule out the possibility of selfgoverning states being able to survive under some set of functional forms that would allow this to occur. We consider then our counterexample to the coexistence of selfgovernance and lordships and our inability to find any examples in which this can occur as strong theoretical evidence for the difficulty of self-governance surviving in the presence of predators. Of course, discovering conditions in other model that would yield the viability of self-governance is an important topic for future research.
Another issue for future research is the generalization of the function p(x) to allow the fraction of output help by peasants to depend on the numbers of bandits and peasants. The absence of such a dependence has allowed us to essentially fix the payoff of peasants and, therefore, the payoff of all other occupations. Whereas in preliminary explorations of such a generalization we have not found any reason to believe that the main qualitative results-the tendency of competition to yield less efficiency and the difficulty of self-governance-would change, nevertheless it would be worth examining the more general case so as to confirm this conjecture.
Concluding comments
We have examined the provision of protection within a simple and stark context. The framework we have employed has allowed us to make inferences both about the internal organization of the states that could emerge and about their market structure. While self-governance yields higher welfare for predator and prey alike, the small size of self-governing states along with the coercive machinery that can be employed by predatory states make the long-run viability of self-governance problematic. Hence hierarchy and predatory behavior towards subjects is the more stable form of internal organization; and competition among such states for the rents thus created is the dominant market structure. However, in contrast to ordinary economic markets, the more competition there is in the market for protection, the worse it is-competing lords and their entourages extract what would have been taken in their absence by simple bandits.
A possibly helpful analogy is to think of the state as an onion, albeit with layers that have different character and color. Layers of autocratic and coercive habits lie below others with more democratic conventions, constitutions, legal codes, ideologies, or norms that govern interactions in most of today's states. Once in a while, something occurs and pierces the modern layers leading to the previous ones that lay dormant. Outbreaks of violence, coercion, and horrors can ensue. Our purpose in this paper has been to improve understanding of what lies in these deeper layers, in the subcortex of the State's brain. In much of economics these outer layers of the state have been taken for granted, a practice that in the somewhat tranquil post-World War II period may have been harmless and typically useful for understanding economic behavior in industrialized countries. But the inner layers of the state have always been making their ugly presence felt in much of the developing world and more recently have systematically confronted transition economies. Ignoring the fundamental problem in providing security and protection, and treating systematic deviations from ideal notions of the state as aberrations would not appear to be a fruitful attitude. Looking into the inner layers of the state is a comparatively easy task, because of their starkness and relative simplicity. Understanding how the outer layers of the modern state, including representative democracy, have appeared among seas of coercive governance appears to be a more difficult task. f = f n gl / q (n wl , n w−l ) N p . Note that Assumption 3 implies that q l is strictly concave in n wl and twice differentiable. Then, V l in (12) is as follows:
To show the concavity of V l in n wl and n gl , we will show that the Hessian of V l (with respect to those two variables) is negative definite. Letting q l 1 and q l 11 denote the first and second partial derivatives of q l with respect to its first argument (n wl ), successive differentiation of V l yields:
where
Note that A is the same as A(z), defined in Claim 1, with z = n gl / q l N p . By Claim 1, then, A is positive. Since p (·) is concave and f (·) is strictly concave, C, as defined above, is negative. Finally, since q is concave in its first argument, q l 11 is nonpositive. Altogether, those properties readily imply the negativity of both ∂ 2 V l /∂n 2 wl and ∂ 2 V l /∂n 2 gl . Consequently, the determinants of the first principal minors of the Hessian of V l are negative, as is necessary for the concavity of V l .
The determinant of the Hessian itself is H = ∂ 2 V l /∂n 2 wl [∂ 2 V l /∂n 2 gl ] − ∂ 2 V l / ∂n wl ∂n gl 2 which, given the calculations above, can be shown to equal
(1 − x * ) q l 11 AB/q l . Given that q l 11 < 0.A > 0, and C < 0, that determinant is positive. It follows that the Hessian of V l is negative definite and, therefore, V l is concave in n wl and n gl . Then, for the given number of lords, N l , and a number of peasants N p , a Nash equilibrium exists. Part (ii): Let g l N p and w l N p denote the continuous functions mentioned in the "if" part of (ii)'s statement. Then, note that the induced number of bandits for any given N p , and assuming the lords play Nash equilibrium strategies that induce were to be identical for all l = 1, . . . , N l or, given the costliness of guards and warriors, if z l ≡ n gl / q l N p were also to be identical across lords. First note that ∂ V l /∂n gl evaluated at n gl = 0 equals
which is positive since the concavity of f (·) along with f (0) = 0 imply f (0) ≥ 1 > 1 − x * . In turn, this property implies that n gl is always positive for all l. Therefore at the lordship regime values, we must have either
or p x * + f (z l ) = 1 (where in the latter case ∂ V l /∂n g evaluated at z l would be positive). The solution in terms of z l , because f (·) is strictly concave and p (·) con-To show uniqueness, let n w and n 2 w denote the choices of warriors associated with two different regimes and w.l.o.g. suppose n 2 w > n w (≥ 0). Then, the following relationships would hold between the pairs of derivatives:
But the concavity of h (·) along with n 2 w > n w contradict this last inequality. Therefore our initial supposition of two different short-run lordship regimes must be false; there is only one symmetric regime.
Part (iv), (a): We have just shown that a unique and symmetric short-run lordship regime exists for any given number of lords. The number of peasants in such a short-run lordship regime is:
where all variables are assumed to be at the regime values. From the proof of part (iii), it can be shown that, regardless of N l ,
That property also implies that the same level of protection is provided across different regimes, that p ≡ p(x * + f (z)) does not vary across regimes (and depends only on the technologies of private and collective protection). In turn, that property along with condition (I I ) implies that the number of bandits is related to the number of peasants as follows:
Using (A5) and (A6), we can eliminate n g and N b from (A4), which after re-arranging can be written as:
If n w were 0, an increase in the number of lords, N l , would clearly lead to a reduction in the number of peasants, N p . Thus, for the rest of this proof we assume an interior (Nash equilibrium) choice of guards (n w > 0). Then, the first-order condition of the symmetric equilibrium under (11) implies:
